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wellbeing, morality, and the 
aim of psychoanalysis
talia morag1
What is the aim of psychoanalysis? Why should we do it? Or, to put it in capi-
talistic consumerist terms, what is it selling? At the end of the day, one’s life is 
somehow supposed to improve after analysis. But what would count as improve-
ment? What are the standards against which such improvement will be evaluated 
and who is to set those standards? This is how the question of the aim of analysis 
relates to the ethical question that haunts philosophy since its beginnings in An-
cient Greece. What is the good life? Is there a general answer to that question; 
and, if not, then how are we to approach the question of what the good life looks 
like in each individual life? 
This psychoanalytic concern and philosophical question of the good life com-
prises a central theme in Russell Grigg’s recent work, primarily in his conference 
papers. My engagement with Grigg’s philosophy of psychoanalysis has been pre-
dominantly through his spoken thought, in conferences as well as in an ongoing 
private communication since 2008, during which I profited enormously from his 
guidance and psychoanalytic insights.2 This ongoing conversation with Grigg, a 
Lacanian psychoanalyst and a Lacanian thinker, has been possible even if Lacan’s 
work is largely a mystery to me, thanks to Grigg’s rare capacity for speaking about 
psychoanalysis in ordinary language. Arguably this is traceable to Wittgenstein’s 
influence that runs through our shared array of philosophical references, includ-
ing Quine, Donald Davidson, Harry Frankfurt, Richard Moran and Christine Kors-
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gaard.  
In what follows, I examine Grigg’s spoken reflections about the question of well-
being, a constant problem or irritant for the philosophy and the practice of psy-
choanalysis. I shall offer a brief critical reading of the talks he has given during the 
time that I have had known him, ask some questions that I would like to form the 
basis of on-going conversations on these topics and finally suggest my own take 
on the matter of the aim of psychoanalysis. 
A layperson would expect, perhaps, that the aim of psychoanalysis is to increase 
one’s happiness or wellbeing. But this is, surprisingly, decidedly not the case, at 
least not in any straightforward way. That is, somehow analysis should, if all goes 
well, increase the patient’s wellbeing, but not by aiming to achieve wellbeing as a 
goal. 
To begin with, the patient cannot aim for it because she does not know exactly in 
the beginning of analysis what the notion of wellbeing would mean to her at the 
end of analysis. In fact, it is more than likely that her initial ideas of what a happy 
life would be for her comprise part of her problem. Rather than having a clear idea 
of the good life from the start, a successful analysis would reveal or rather get a 
person to realize what is good for her and in what way. 
Neither should the analyst aim for the patient’s wellbeing because it is not the 
analyst’s role to impose any specific notion of wellbeing (and there are many 
of those around) on the patient. As Jonathan Lear often emphasizes, analysis is 
meant to increase a person’s freedom.3 Guiding a person toward a specific goal 
would unduly constrain her and put obstacles in her way to mental health. Nev-
ille Symington describes such an intentional activity as interference with therapy, 
and quotes Wilfred Bion saying: “I don’t know why you are so angry with me. I am 
not trying to help you.”4 In fact, this quote suggests that trying to help an analy-
sand is more than interference, but an act of aggression, an intrusion on a per-
son’s freedom and capacity to make up her own mind, to identify her own desires. 
Yet Symington recently asked me about my own psychotherapist: “Did she help 
you?” Somehow, although analysts are not supposed to intentionally help their pa-
tients – that is, they are not to help under that description, as Elizabeth Anscombe 
would say5—it is nevertheless a good synoptic description of what they are doing, 
if they are doing a good job, which involves, paradoxically, not trying to help. 
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And so Grigg says: 
Psychoanalysis is not a helping profession; it is not even a form of therapy, 
if being a therapy implies having a therapeutic aim. […] What therapeutic 
benefits there are that come out of analysis arise from the fact that the 
aim is directed elsewhere, towards some other outcome. Of course, this 
takes place on the assumption that something beneficial for the patient 
will arise out of it, but only as a fringe benefit, as it were, of the treatment 
itself. This therapeutic paradox is similar to the hedonistic paradox, ac-
cording to which you will never achieve happiness by making happiness 
your goal. You have to aim at something else, whatever that something 
else might be, and then, if you’re lucky, pursuing that goal might make you 
happy. Psychoanalysis works in the same way: aim to make your patients’ 
life go better and you will most likely fail. Aim to maintain a discourse in 
which they can explore their unconscious desires, and there’s a chance 
their life will go better.6 
“A chance their life will go better”? Isn’t that an aim then? And how are we to 
understand the term “better” here? And why would anyone go to analysis if this 
betterment were a mere accidental “fringe benefit” that may or may not occur, 
depending on “chance” or luck?  Let me acknowledge my own persisting desire to 
understand what psychoanalysts refuse to spell out by rephrasing one of Grigg’s 
favorite quotes by Octave Manonni who notices the frequency with which people 
say… “I know very well…. But still…”:7 So yes, we know very well that analysis does 
not set wellbeing as its goal, but still—we all go to analysis with the hope that this 
newly found self-understanding will make us somehow happier or help us lead a 
better life. So once we get there, what did we get exactly? How can we understand 
this non-aim that we are all nevertheless striving for? 
What we achieve, says Grigg, is some kind of character development, which prima 
facie seems similar to the Aristotelian call for the development of the virtues. But 
there are two crucial differences from the Aristotelian notion, which make it un-
suitable to be the aim of psychoanalysis. First, as Grigg explains, Aristotle under-
stands the human flourishing that is achievable through the cultivation of virtues 
to be universal.8 Grigg emphasizes the universality of the notion of “eudaimonia” 
and talks about its constituents as constituting “the sovereign good”. Grigg claims 
then, that inasmuch as psychoanalysis is concerned, universal notions of the good 
consist in ideals that often ironically comprise an obstacle to the good life.
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Secondly, the virtues Aristotle has in mind belong to the moral realm. But whatev-
er virtues or character traits one should aim to develop in analysis—they are not 
going to belong to the moral realm. In fact, Grigg claims that psychoanalysis does 
not see morality as part of the good life. It is rather a cause for pathology. As Grigg 
explains, Freud saw morality as unhealthy for us.9 The more “moral” we are, says 
Grigg, the more critical we are of ourselves.10 Our moral standards cause us great 
guilt. And that guilt is often unconscious, it comes together with an unconscious 
desire to be punished, and it manifests itself in psychological symptoms and in 
our refusal to let go of those symptoms.11 In short, as Grigg says: “The therapeutic 
aim of analysis frequently finds itself at loggerheads with morality.”12 
I want to claim here, that these two differences actually converge to what psy-
choanalysis should object to in Aristotle, an objection that is not at all evident in 
psychoanalytic literature. I am referring to the Phrominos, the Aristotelian ideal 
of the fully virtuous person who thanks to education and self-cultivation feels or 
undergoes emotional episodes “at the right times, with reference to the right ob-
jects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way” as well as 
does the right thing at the right time and for the right reasons.13  This ideal charac-
ter is not only universal and moral, it is also ideally rational, and it is this ideal that 
clashes with the aims of psychoanalysis, whatever those may be. People who think 
they are close to this ideal in this or that respect, that they are “less than fully vir-
tuous” but not that much less—live an illusion they would be better off without.14
Rather than to Aristotle, Grigg suggests that the philosophical ancestry of psy-
choanalysis goes back to Plato, in particular to the allegory of the cave. Similarly 
to Plato’s call to see the shadows of the cave for what they are, psychoanalysis 
also aims at enlightenment, a “loss of illusions, [a] collapsing of ideals, and even 
a certain collapsing of morality.”15 
Grigg here uses the Lacanian term “semblant,” which means in French something 
between appearance and pretense, with the further connotation of imitation.16 As 
I interpret Grigg interpreting Lacan, semblants are close to what Christine Kors-
gaard calls “practical identities,” our social roles and group belongings, such as 
being a wife, a mother, or a member of the neighborhood cat rescue organization. 
The notion of character here is no longer a collection of virtues but of practical 
identities. But unlike the seriousness with which Korsgaard describes a practical 
identity, as “a description under which you value yourself, a description under 
which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth under-
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taking,”17 these practical identities come with a Sartrean twist. Recall what Sartre 
says about the waiter in a Parisian café: 
His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. 
He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends for-
ward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too 
solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to 
imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while 
carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope-walker by putting it 
in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he per-
petually re-establishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. All his 
behavior seems to us a game. […]  He is playing, he is amusing himself. But 
what is he playing? […] He is playing at being a waiter in a café.18 
At some level we know that our social roles do not sum us up, that their typical 
characterizations are forced upon us by the social world, and that to some extent 
we are not just playing our roles—we are role-playing. For Sartre this was impor-
tant: on the one hand we are the roles that we play and the manner in which we 
cooperate with our social definitions, and on the other hand we are not. Avowing 
only one aspect of ourselves, either the way we are objectified by others under 
certain identities or group-belongings, or alternatively the way that we as subjects 
can transcend any such objectification, can often be exploited as a strategy of bad 
faith and denial of responsibility. A stable social life is a life where we implicitly 
accept both these aspects, where we negotiate how we specifically inhabit our 
practical identities and what they commit us to through our choices and actions. 
But according to Grigg, in analysis, this implicit knowledge of the indeterminacy 
of our practical identities becomes a difficult explicit realization. At some point 
in analysis our semblants or our practical identities become “wobbly”, as Grigg 
describes them.19 Jonathan Lear also speaks of such moments and characterizes 
them as “ironic.” These are moments where, according to Lear, a person reflects 
on her duties and obligations that she associates with a certain practical identity, 
say on her being a woman, and on her various actions made under that identity 
about which she is emotionally conflicted, and asks herself: “What does any of this 
have to do with being a woman?”20  
This wobbling of identities has been called the “Socratic Effect.”21 The phrase, 
“Socratic Effect,” was a term in currency amongst the French intellectuals to refer 
to the effect of truth-telling, explains Grigg in conversation. But there is another 
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way to understand the suitability of the term for the occasion. What is a woman? 
What obligations or commitments and responsibilities are involved in this role? 
This is a typical Socratic question. 
Grigg further says that suddenly losing confidence in our practical identities, or 
suddenly losing one such identity entirely or gaining a new and unfamiliar one, 
comprises a trauma of the sort that often brings us to analysis, such as “[b]eing 
abandoned by a lover, falling in love, losing a job, getting a job one can’t manage 
[…].”22 Unlike such traumas that are inflicted upon us suddenly by our social real-
ity and experienced as a crisis that may lead us to analysis, analysis itself is what 
Grigg calls “a gentle awakening”, a “slow-burn” trauma. And somehow, this “non-
traumatic traumatization,” through which, I take it, we may abandon an identity 
or adopt a new one or change our way of inhabiting existing identities, is sup-
posed to be beneficial.23 It is useful to recall Ian Hacking here saying that “[s]elf-
knowledge is a virtue in its own right.”24 There is clearly an ethics of truth here, a 
struggle against self-deception and bad faith, “a recognition of reality,” as Freud 
put it.25  
I am skeptical about wobbling of semblants and their Socratic effect or about 
ironic reflections about practical identities. These descriptions seem to me to be 
ad hoc rationalizations of a longer process that has already happened by the time 
it is described. But I will not pursue this line of criticism here.  Whatever is the 
case, I want to ask Grigg to say more about the truth that remains. Whereas the 
Socratic dialogues often end in aporia, Grigg promises us that “[t]his slow process 
of ‘disidentification’ doesn’t mean that the subject ends up with no identifica-
tions.”26 What does the patient end up with then? What sense do we make of 
the notion of character that is composed of our practical identities? What would 
count as a beneficial development of a character described in this manner? Kors-
gaard and Lear impose rational constraints on the collection of one’s practical 
identities. Does Grigg? How is this disidentification meant to occur? This is an 
issue we need to hear more about. 
At times Grigg gives a positive description: “a certain robustness of character, 
let’s say, that makes you resilient to life’s misfortunes, capable of enjoying the 
pleasures of life, which includes the capacity for love, and a readiness to change 
the world to meet your desires, which is the capacity for work.”27 What would 
count as healthy resilience in contrast to unhealthy repression? Many well-func-
tioning people who love and work need and go to psychotherapy. The trick is to 
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see how these could be improved. If this is how wellbeing is spelled out then we 
need to know what counts as good love and good work.
In conversations, Russell Grigg abandons the notion of character development 
and talks about the benefit of analysis in terms of a person’s symptom, which is 
normally what brings a person to seek therapy in the first place. The point is not 
to cure the patient from the symptom, but “to put the symptom to use.”28 In other 
words—people can make the symptom work for them. For them? To make their 
life better? For their wellbeing? And what is that?
Most of Grigg’s detailed discussion about the question of the good psychoanalysis 
can bring a person is a negative characterization of analysis—it is not aimed at 
happiness, it is not aimed at becoming moral, indeed it is a lot about ridding the 
patient from harsh moral demands that make her suffer from harmful guilt feel-
ings; and it is about giving up and slowly dissolving illusory or unsuitable identi-
ties and too demanding ideals. What we have here is a notion of freedom from… 
rather than of freedom to… I take Grigg’s spelling-out of this negative notion to 
be a retroactive description of what I want to call the letting-go we find ourselves 
experiencing in analysis. But still, where does this letting-go lead and what is the 
good of it?
I conclude by raising a challenge to Grigg, and by suggesting a different take on the 
question of the aim of psychoanalysis. Firstly, Freud, as Grigg explains, thought 
morality is a cause of pathology and aggression toward others as well as toward 
oneself.29 Granted, morality has a dark side, specifically since, as Russell explains 
in his discussion of Freud and Kant in Lacan, Language, and Philosophy, morality 
is often a matter of prohibition, of what we should not do. But Freud would also 
agree that prohibition is what makes civilization possible. In fact, the prohibition 
of incest, for example, is the very condition of possibility of civilization, accord-
ing to Freud, who was a great admirer of civilization, despite the neuroses that it 
produces in its citizens. Surely to say that morality is bad for us tout court—a claim 
that Grigg ascribes to Freud30—is to overspeak. Indeed, I highly doubt that Grigg 
or any other psychoanalyst would be so delighted to liberate the desires of a mur-
derous sociopath or a paedophile rapist as to think of these liberated desires as 
exemplary of mental health. Although there is surely an important insight in the 
thought that morality can be bad for us, we need a better understanding of that 
insight which, unqualified, is highly implausible. 
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Somehow we need to make a distinction between healthy morality on the one 
hand and unhealthy moralism on the other, where we reserve the harshness of 
undue punishment to moralistic rather than to moral demands we have of our-
selves. What is the difference between being moral and being too moral? This is a 
philosophical question that further depends on getting clear about what morality 
is in the first place—a highly vexed question in its own right.31 And it is another 
place where psychoanalysis and philosophy intersect. As Grigg’s thought repeat-
edly shows, the work in the psychoanalyst’s clinic and conceptual questions about 
psychology inter-relate and mutually enrich one another. 
I return to the matter of the aim of analysis. Psychoanalysis may not be selling a 
product, but it nevertheless requires further self-understanding, a more clear idea 
of how to supplement or fill out its purely negative notion of wellbeing. And this is 
not at all as paradoxical as Grigg and others would have it. The analyst cannot im-
pose any specific instructions of what that patient’s good life shall be, whether she 
should change jobs or leave home etc. But this does not mean that psychoanalysis 
cannot aim at some positive picture of the good life, and by “picture” I am refer-
ring to Wittgenstein’s idea of a model that captures the imagination, that is not 
in itself true or false, and that has content only when applied to reality.32 In fact, 
the Phrominos is not merely the collection of virtues; it also comes with a picture. 
The Aristotelian notion does not provide an actual person to imitate or follow, 
nor a list of instructions of what to do when. It provides a picture of the rational 
and moral person: a bit of guru; wise and flawless; well-measured and balanced. 
Psychoanalysis should be able to offer an alternative picture to this rationalistic 
image. 
That picture, as I will all too briefly sketch here, would be of a person that is giving 
in to life, a phrase that requires unpacking, but that I hope is nonetheless sugges-
tive, and that includes an openness to unpredictable change in one’s emotions, 
desires and values. Instead of finding the Phronimos’s “middle way” between ex-
tremes it is a person who can live with those contradictions that are irreconcil-
able in her emotions, desires and values. One cannot exactly aim at becoming 
this person, since life, the affective life of emotions and desires, is something that 
happens, not something we choose to have. And giving-in to life and the letting-
go that occurs in analysis and which facilitates this adventurous surrender and 
acceptance of one’s own creativity, also belong to the realm of affect. But this is 
not an accidental fringe benefit. It is rather a more or less anticipated side-effect, 
which importantly also includes a relief from the original issue that brought one 
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to analysis, even if by the time that relief arrives the person no longer sees it as 
her primary goal. It is a side-effect of the skill of self-awareness one acquires in 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy, the skill to “listen” to oneself,32 to become aware 
of one’s ongoing associations, of the imaginative connections among thoughts, 
emotions, desires, or memories that pop in one’s mind or bodily reactions that 
come to one’s attention. There is such a thing as imaginative self-knowledge and 
that is, I take it, the aim of psychoanalysis.
Deakin University
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